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ABSTRACT
The recent emergence of the small cloud (SC), both in concept and
in practice, has been driven mainly by issues related to service
cost and complexity of commercial cloud providers (e.g., Amazon)
employing massive data centers. However, the resource inelasticity
problem [29] faced by the SCs due to their relatively scarce re-
sources might lead to a potential degradation of customer QoS and
loss of revenue. A proposed solution to this problem recommends
the sharing of resources between competing SCs to alleviate the
resource inelasticity issues that might arise. Based on this idea, a
recent effort ([18]) proposed SC-Share, a performance-driven static
market model for competitive small cloud environments that results
in an efficient market equilibrium jointly optimizing customer QoS
satisfaction and SC revenue generation. However, an important
question with a non-obvious answer still remains to be answered,
without which SC sharing markets may not be guaranteed to sus-
tain in the long-run - is it still possible to achieve a stable market
efficient state when the supply of SC resources is dynamic in nature?.
In this paper, we take a first step to addressing the problem of
efficient market design for single SC resource sharing in dynamic
environments. We answer our previous question in the affirmative
through the use of Arrow and Hurwicz’s disequilibrium process
[9, 10] in economics, and the gradient play technique in game the-
ory that allows us to iteratively converge upon efficient and stable
market equilibria.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is becoming increasingly popular and pervasive in
the information technology (IT) marketplace due to its on-demand
resource provisioning, high availability, and elasticity. These fea-
tures allow cloud end users (e.g., individuals, small-scale compa-
nies, world-wide enterprises) to access resources in a pay-as-you-go
manner and to meet varying demands sans upfront resource com-
mitments [8]. Cloud service providers (Amazon AWS [1], Google
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Compute Engine [4], and Microsoft Azure [6]) allow customers to
quickly deploy their services without a large initial infrastructure
investment.
1.1 The Rise of Small-Scale Data Centers
There are some non-trivial concerns in obtaining service from large-
scale public clouds, including cost and complexity. Massive cloud
environments can be costly and inefficient for some customers (e.g.,
Blippex [3]), thus resulting in more and more customers building
their own smaller data centers [2] for better control of resource
usage; for example, it is hard to guarantee network performance in
large-scale public clouds due to their multi-tenant environments
[21]. Moreover, smaller data center providers exhibit greater flex-
ibility in customizing services for their users, while large-scale
public providers minimize their management overhead by simplify-
ing their services; e.g., Linode [5] distinguishes itself by providing
clients with easier and more flexible service customization. The
use of small-scale clouds (SCs) is one approach to solving cost and
complexity issues.
Despite the potential emergence of small-scale clouds, due to
their moderate sizes, they are likely to suffer from resource under-
provisioning, thus failing to meet peak demand at times. This leads
to a resource provisioning dilemma where the SCs have to make
the tradeoff between request loss and the cost of over-provisioning.
One way out of this dilemma is for such small clouds to cooper-
ate with each other to help meet each others’ user demand via
resource sharing at low costs, thereby increasing their individual
resources when in need without having to significantly invest in
more. Such cooperation is analogous to Business Clusters described
in mainstream economics which emerge due to, among other fac-
tors, shared interests and geographical proximity [28].
1.2 Research Motivation
In this section, we briefly describe the problem setting followed by
the challenges that motivate us to alleviate them.
Problem Setting. The effective sharing or borrowing resources
by an SC from its peers involves mutually satisfying the interests
of the stakeholders in context. In this paper, we consider three
different stakeholders: (i) the SC customers, (ii) profit maximizing
autonomous SCs, and (iii) a regulatory agency overseeing certain
functioning aspects of the autonomous SCs (e.g., ensuring customer
data privacy). The SC customers are interested in achieving cer-
tain performance measures for their jobs (e.g., low job response
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time, cheap storage); the SCs are interested in maximizing revenues
obtained from serving customers; and a regulatory agency (e.g.,
the local government, a federated agency [24][23]) is interested in
ensuring a proper manner by which the autonomous SCs conduct
their business of lending resources to peer SCs (e.g., many European
countries are now concerned about preserving data privacy and
disallowing their data leaving European borders [20]). We term the
above setting as an SC market.
The Challenges. Ideally, an SC would want to service all its
customers solely using its own resources. However, the primary
barrier to this goal is its individual resource capacity which might
not be enough to service peak customer demand. In such a case, the
SC can either resort to peer SCs for additional resources, thereby
incurring borrowing costs, and/or buy the services of a big public
cloud (e.g., Amazon). The latter option is generally more expensive
than the former and also likely to bemore privacy threatening. Thus,
from an SC’s viewpoint, its challenge is to satisfy two conflicting
objectives: (i) to generate as much revenue by serving its customer
demands, and (ii) to incur as low as possible, borrowing and/or
buying costs from other clouds. For simplicity purposes, we assume
that buying resources from big clouds (e.g., Google, Amazon) is the
last resort for an SC in events of low resource availability, and in
such events it would try its best to get resources from peer SCs.
Another challenge is to ensure that at market equilibrium (see
below), the SCs and their customers ideally operate on parameters
(see Section 2) that allow the market to be efficient, a condition
commonly characterized in microeconomics by certain popular
functions (see Section 2.3) of market stakeholder utilities, and one
that entails optimal social welfare allocation amongst the SCs and
their customers. This is a non-trivial and challenging task as the
existence of a market equilibrium does not necessarily implymarket
efficiency [19]. In this regard, the authors in [18] show the existence
of SC market equilibrium through numerical simulations, and do
not provide a general theory for equilibrium existence. In addition
to the above mentioned challenges, the SC market is dynamic in
nature due to the non-static nature of the supply of SC resources,
as well as due to the variations in customer demand over time,
and failures.This dynamic nature of the SC market is likely to lead
to frequent market equilibrium perturbations and potentially a
state of market disequilibrium. Conditioned on the achievability of
a market efficient equilibrium, a state of eventual disequilibrium
will threaten the long-term sustainability of SC markets. Here,
the term ‘market equilibrium’ refers to a situation in which all
market stakeholders mutually satisfy their interests, in which case
an important challenge is to design a stable market that is robust
to perturbations and eventually returns to its equilibrium point(s).
Our Goal. In this paper, our goal is to formulate the joint ‘stake-
holder satisfaction problem’ in dynamic SC environments as an effi-
cient, stable, and sustainable dynamic market/ecosystem design task,
and propose an effective solution for it.
1.3 Research Contributions
We make the following research contributions in this paper.
• We propose a utility theory based small cloud competitive
market model comprising of SC customers, profit maximiz-
ing autonomous SCs, and a regulatory agency overseeing
some functionality aspects of the SCs, as the market stake-
holders. Themodelmathematically expresses the stakeholder
interests in terms of utility functions and paves the path for
analyzing SC markets for market equilibrium properties (see
Section 2).
• Using the notion of a disequilibrium process proposed by
Arrow and Hurwicz [9, 10], we apply the gradient play tech-
nique in game theory [26] that is based on the theory of
differential equations, to investigate the dynamic market set-
ting where a static market equilibrium (conditioned on their
existence) is potentially subject to perturbations that might
lead to market disequilibrium. In this regard, we show (in
theory) that static market equilibria achieved in small cloud
markets (see Appendix for details on static markets, as it is
not the main focus of our paper) is asymptotically stable in
dynamic market settings. Our use of the gradient play tech-
nique is motivated by the fact that in many practical market
environments stakeholders (i) find it behaviorally difficult
or computationally expensive to play their best responses
[14], (ii) have zero or incomplete knowledge of the utilities
of other stakeholders in the market, and (iii) cannot even
observe the actions of other stakeholders in the worst case.
In such environments, gradient play is a suitable technique
to achieve static market equilibrium stability iteratively [15],
from a state of disequilibrium. More specifically, for our
market setting the occurrence of (i)-(iii) is quite likely. The
gradient play technique also works to achieve static market
equilibrium when issues (i)-(iii) do not arise (see Section 2.3).
Differences and Drawbacks w.r.t. [18] - Related literature on
cloud sharing frameworks and their economics are detailed in the
very recent paper by Lin et.al., [18]. Here, we state the differences
and drawbacks of our contributions in this paper with respect to
the work in [18].
Our work is a necessarily important theoretical extension of [18]
that was the first of its kind in the analysis of small cloud markets.
There, the authors considered consequences of performance (i.e.,
queueing theory) driven non-cooperative game-theoretic (with no
SC willing to share its utility and capacity information with others,
i.e., an incomplete information game-theoretic setting) resource
sharing on the resulting performance delivered to customers at
static market equilibrium, something not considered by any of the
above-mentioned efforts. However, [18] does not consider the im-
portant problem of analyzing equilibrium stability under variations
in SC resource availability, in a non-cooperative game-theoretic SC
environment.Without showing the existence of a stable SC market,
one, based on the existing results showing the existence of a market
equilibrium, cannot not say much regarding the sustainability of SC
markets in the future. A characterization of this scenario is an im-
portant contribution of this work. A major difference of our work
with the one in [18], is the lack of a queuing-driven performance
model to reduce the equilibrium search space. However, our work
is orthogonal in the sense that, given the existence of (efficient)
market equilibria, we investigate whether such a state is sustainable
in the long run.
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2 COMPETITIVE MARKET MODEL
In this section, we propose a utility theory based small cloud Wal-
rasian competitive market model comprising of profit maximizing
autonomous SCs, their customers, and a regulatory agency oversee-
ing some functionality aspects of the SCs. A Walrasian competitive
market [19] represents a pure exchange economy without produc-
tion, where there are a finite number of agents, i.e., SCs in our
work, endowed with a finite number of commodities, i.e., comput-
ing resources in our work, that are traded with SC customers and
peer SCs. The aim behind proposing the model is to pave the path
for mathematically analyzing SC markets for market equilibrium
properties, and derive their practical implications.
In this paper, we consider each SC customer to deal with three
job types, where each job comprises multiple tasks: (i) Type I jobs
that need to be serviced wholly/entirely when they arrive (e.g., a
user could invoke a regular MapReduce batch job that defines a
set of Mappers and Reducers to be executed for the job to com-
plete in its entirety.), (ii) Type II jobs that can be curtailed to fewer
tasks (e.g., an approximate computation job as in [7]), where the
curtailment decision primarily arising from (a) the nature of VM
instance prices, (b) the unnecessity of the job to continue executing
beyond a certain accuracy already achieved, and (c) the unnecessity
of the job to continue executing beyond a certain deadline, and (iii)
Type III jobs where certain tasks can be shifted over time for future
processing, the remaining job tasks requiring service as they arrive
(e.g., analyzing a DNA sequence, re-running partially/entirely a
current job later when it gets killed in a spot cloud environment
due to momentary unavailability of resources.). Next, we model the
stakeholders in the SC market.
2.1 Modeling the SCs
Let there be n autonomous profit maximizing SCs. Each SC can be
geographically distributed. Customer demand for SC i is a set of
processing tasks from its customers (both end-users and peer SCs)
that require the use of virtual machines. We assume that each SC
i reserves (allocates) a total of vmri virtual machines (VMs) in its
data center to service demand from its customers. We term such
VMs as reserved VMs. The value of vmri is pre-determined by SC i
based on the statistics of customer demand patterns observed over
a period of time. For simplicity, we will focus on VMs representing a
single resource type in this paper. The case for multi-resources will be
dealt in future work. In the event thatvmri machines are insufficient
to satisfy consumer demand, SC i borrowsvmbi VMs from peer SCs.
Here, vmbi is the number of borrowed VMs available to SC i from
its peers. In the event that both reserved and borrowed VMs are
insufficient to meet customer demand, SC i resorts to a public cloud
forvm
pc
i VM instances. We assume here that a public cloud is large
enough to provide any required number of VM instances to SCs.
We do not consider communication network bandwidth issues to
be a bottleneck to customer service satisfaction in this paper.
Let c(vmri ) be the associated operating cost to SC i for reserving
vmri virtual machines to serve its customers. We define c(vm
r
i ) via
a separable equation of the following form.
c(vmri ) = f1(vm
r
i ) + f2(vm
r
i ), (1)
where f1(·) (a linear function) and f1(·) (a non-linear function) are
functions such that the marginal operating cost for SC i is a gen-
eral decreasing linear function of the number of VM instances, i.e.,
the additional operating cost,
dc
dvmri
, due to a unit increase in the
number of VMs required to service customer demand varies in a
negative linear fashion with the number of VMs. Such marginal
cost functions are also popular in economics to model diminish-
ing costs/returns [19]. We approximate the number of VMs as a
non-discrete quantity. Specifically, for the purpose of analysis, we
assume the cost function c(·) to be concave, quadratic, and twice
continuously differentiable, i.e., the marginal costs become decreas-
ing linear functions of the number of VM instances. We can define
one such c(vmri ) function as follows.









where α ir (a positive value) and β
i
r (a negative value) are SC i’s
cost coefficients for its reserved resources, i.e., virtual machines,
such that the marginal operating cost for SC i is a negative linear
function. The above quadratic form of the cost function, apart
from satisfying the property of negative linear marginals, not only
allows for tractable analysis, but also serves as a good second-order
approximation for the broader class of concave payoffs [13]. We
define π ri to be the profit that SC i makes through its reserved VMs
for servicing customers, and define the maximum profit that SC i
can make, via the following optimization problem.
max
vmri


















are the lower and upper bounds
for the number of VM instances reserved by SC i for its customers.
We assume that each SC i is small enough not to be able to exert
market power over its peer SCs and strategically influence the prices
they charge their customers. i.e., each SC is a price taker [19]. The
prices that individual SCs charge their customers are determined by
individual SCs in price competition with one another in the process
of maximizing their own net utilities.
Let c(vmbi ) be the associated operating cost to SC i for borrowing
vmbi virtual machines from peer SCs to serve customers, when the
reserved VMs are not enough to satisfy customer service demands.
Like in the case of formulating c(vmri ), we formulate c(vm
b
i ) in
a manner such that the associated marginal operating costs for
borrowing an additional VM instance decreases in a negative linear
fashion with the number of VMs. Mathematically, we represent
c(vmbi ) by the following equation:









where α ib (a positive quantity) and β
i
b ( a negative quantity) are SC
i’s coefficients for its borrowed virtual machines. We denote by πbi
the profit that SC i makes when borrowing VMs from peer SCs for
servicing customers, and define the maximum profit that SC i can
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are the lower and upper bounds for
the number of VM instances borrowed by SC i for its customers,
from peer SCs, (ii) c(vm
pc
i ) is the cost to SC i to offload vm
pc
i
VM instances worth of customer demand to a public cloud in the
event that vmri and vm
b
i VM instances together are not enough
to service i’s total customer demand. We represent c(vm
pc
i ) in the
samemanner as c(vmri ) and c(vm
b















where α ipc (a positive quantity) and β
i
pc (a negative quantity) are
SC i’s coefficients for the resources the public cloud uses to ser-
vice i’s offloaded customer demand portions. We do not assume
any constraints on the resources available to the public cloud for
servicing offloading requests by SCs.
2.2 Modeling SC Customers
For a customer j who has a Type I job, we express this customer’s
utility for that job as a concave, quadratic, and twice continuously
differentiable separable function,Uj (·), defined as follows.
Uj (vm
e









where vmej is the amount of VM instances required to process j’s
entire job. Similar to the motivation and rationale behind the con-
cave quadratic cost functions for SCs, the utility function of an SC
customer is designed such that the marginal utility for the customer
is a decreasing linear function of the number of VM instances, i.e.,
the additional utility increase due to a unit increase in the number
of VMs varies in a negative linear fashion with the number of VMs.
αej (a positive quantity) and β
e
j (a negative quantity) in the above
equation are j’s utility coefficients.
As in the case of a customer with a Type I job, for a customer
j who has a Type II job, we express his utility for that job as a













where vmcj is the amount of VM instances required to process j’s













j ∈ (0, 1).
Here, αej (a positive value) and β
e
j (a negative value) are j’s utility
coefficients for Type I jobs. The interpretation of vmcj is as follows:
κ1jvm
e
j is the number of VMs required to accomplish j’s curtailed
task, whereas κ2jvm
e
j is the additional number of unused VMs that
contribute to j’s extra utility when its job is curtailed, and provides
it with an overall perceived satisfaction greater than that obtained
from the utility derived solely using κ1jvm
e
j used VMs for the cur-
tailed job.
For a customer j who has a Type III job, similar to the case of
Type I and Type II jobs, we express his utility for those tasks as a













where vmsj is the amount of VM instances required to process j’s
time-shiftable tasks, and αsj ( a positive value) and β
s
j (a negative
value) are j’s utility coefficients for time-shiftable jobs.









j VM instances. Therefore,
customer j’s aggregate utility takes a similar form to his utility for
a specific job type, and is given by
Uj (vm
aд















j (a positive quantity) and β
aд
j (a negative quantity) are
j’s utility coefficients for his job aggregate.
We denote π
type
j to be the net utility that customer j generates
through getting service for a given job type = {e, c, s} from its
contracted SC, and define the maximum net utility that customer j





























are the lower and upper bounds
for the number of VM instances used up by customer j’s job type
(be it whole, curtailed, shifted, or aggregate). ρ j is the price paid by
customer j to his chosen SC per VM instance used for his job.
2.3 Modeling the Regulator
The role of the regulator (e.g., the government, a federated agency)
as applicable to our work is to ensure (i) good privacy practices
between SCs, (ii) the design of policies/mechanisms that enable
autonomous SCs to price customers appropriately without making
excessive profits through market exploitation, and (iii) an optimum
level of social welfare allocation amongst the autonomous SCs
at market equilibrium. (i) is specific to our problem setting and
is one of the most important motivations for the presence of a
regulator (see Section 1) in the first place
1
. However, the presence
of a regulator brings in other important benefits through (ii) and (iii).
(ii) is necessary to prevent any SC from exploiting its customers
on service costs. In this work we do not focus on the design of
such mechanisms, and assume the existence of one
2
, whereas (iii)
is important from an economic perspective as maximizing social
1
In practice, using mechanism design theory, the regulator can devise efficient eco-
nomic mechanisms that enable SCs to find it incentive compatible in protecting the
privacy of their customers. However, we do not focus on the design of suchmechanisms
in this paper.
2
Economists Laffont and Tirole have proposed principal-agent models in this regard
[17] which will enable autonomous SCs to charge appropriate prices to customers
purely out of self-interest.
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welfare is a key objective in welfare economics because it leads
to (a) a certain level of equitability of allocations (in resources
or in net utility) amongst the stakeholders, (b) might guarantee
Pareto efficiency at market equilibrium [19], and (c) an optimal
social welfare state denotes the best possible operating point of an
economic system. A Pareto efficient allocation of utilities amongst
a set of stakeholders ensures that at market equilibrium none of
the stakeholders can increase their net utility without decreasing
any other stakeholder’s net utility. The notion of equitability is
important in the context of autonomous SC markets because they
often operate in a decentralized fashion, and ideally, we would
want a social welfare allocation at market equilibrium that does not
result in considerable disparity amongst the players’ allocations
(despite being Pareto efficient).
In this paper, we define the social welfare function of the regula-
tor to be the sum of the net utilities of the SCs and their customers











c(vmri ) + c(vm
b





where C is the set of consumers, SC is the set of small clouds, the
first term is the sum of the utilities of the consumers, and the second
term is the sum of the costs faced by the SCs in SC for servicing
customer demands. The aforementioned social welfare expression is
the standard Bergson-Samuelson utilitarian social welfare function
in economics [19] whose optimality does not focus on equality
of resource or utility allocations amongst stakeholders, i.e., the
SCs and the customers, but only on Pareto efficiency of resource
allocations amongst the stakeholders, and equality of marginal
utility allocations amongst the stakeholders. Note that due to our
autonomous SC setting, the regulator in practice might not have
enough say in welfare maximizing resource allocation, and can only
expect to have the social welfare function maximized in the best
case because it cannot directly enforce optimal strategy choices on
the SCs like in a centralized control setting. The important question
here is whether the utilitarian social welfare function is indeed the
most appropriate choice for this work.
We choose to work with the utilitarian function over two other
popular Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions used in eco-
nomic applications: the egalitarian function, and the Rawl’s function,
for the following reasons:
• The parameters corresponding to the unique optimal so-
lution of the maximum utilitarian social welfare problem
coincide with those obtained at the unique equilibrium of
a purely distributed market comprising autonomous SC’s
without the presence of a regulator, and are Pareto optimal.
This result is due to Arrow-Debreu’s first and second fun-
damental theorems of welfare economics [19]. In addition,
at market equilibrium, there is equitability in the marginal
utilities of all the autonomous SCs (in case of SCs, the utility
is represented by cost and is thus a negative utility) and their
customers. The parameter coincidence property does not
necessarily hold for non-utilitarian social welfare functions.
• The Rawl’s social welfare function focusses on maximizing
the minimum resource/utility allocation to any stakeholder
(e.g., SC) within the class of market stakeholders. A major
drawback of adopting this social welfare function is that it
will in general discourage SCs from sharing their resources
(even at Pareto optimal system settings) with other SCs (con-
sequently affecting customer QoS satisfaction), thereby chal-
lenging the core philosophy behind an SC market, and will
not likely be popular with either the SCs or the regulator. A
maximin utility allocation among SCs would favor, for ex-
ample, a regime that reduces every SC to complete “misery”
if it promotes the well-being of the most “miserable" SC by
even a very small amount.
• The egalitarian social welfare function focusses on equaliz-
ing the utilities of all market stakeholders in the absolute
sense. Similar to the case of Rawl’s function, it suffers from
the major drawback that it will in general discourage SCs
from sharing their resources (even at Pareto optimal system
settings) with other SCs. Likewise, it is unlikely to be popular
amongst either the regulator or autonomous SCs. For exam-
ple, if we had to choose between two allocation policies, one
under which all SCs would have a cardinal utility of 100, but
one SC would have a utility of 99; the second policy under
which every SC is “miserable” and will have a cardinal utility
of 1 unit. The egalitarian regulator would prefer the latter
as every SC has exactly the same utility level.
3 DYNAMIC SC MARKETS
On Dynamic SC Markets - In practice, an SC market can be dy-
namic in nature due to the non-static nature of the supply of SC
resources and variability over time of customer demand. This dy-
namic nature of the SC market is likely to lead to frequent static
market equilibrium (see Appendix for the analysis of static market
equilibria) perturbations, which in turn might (not always) lead to
a state of market disequilibrium. Here, the term ‘disequilibrium’
refers to a state when market supply does not equal market demand
due to perturbations in market parameters (e.g., customer prices),
and as a result all stakeholders do not mutually satisfy their inter-
ests. In such a case, an important challenge is to design a stable market
that is robust to perturbations and always returns to its equilibrium
point(s) when market disequilibrium results. Inspired by the notion
of disequilibrium process [10], we propose a dynamic market mecha-
nism for SCs. The concept of disequilibrium pertains to a situation
where a static market equilibrium is perturbed, potentially to a dis-
equilibrium state, and the underlying players (stakeholders) work
together to re-attain the equilibrium. The main idea behind the dise-
quilibrium process is an iterative sequence of action and state profiles
(see below), i.e., information exchange between the dominant market
stakeholders, of VM instance supply and demand levels, and per-unit
VM instance prices, to arrive at a desired static equilibrium. Such an
iterative process essentially implies an overall dynamic model with
feedback. Our proposed dynamic market mechanism can also be
used to re-attain a specific preferred equilibrium point from a given
equilibrium point. We first present our dynamic market model and
then follow it up with its stability analysis.
3.1 Dynamic Model
Our dynamic model of SC markets consist of a state space, X ⊂ Rn ,
where each state, {ρi } ∈ X , is the profile of per-unit VM instance
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prices at each SC i . The state dependent payoff, i.e., profit function
for each SC from its reserved resources is given by












Similarly, state dependent payoff for each SC from resources bor-








The payoff function for the SC customers for a given job type
∈ {e, c, s}, is given by
Uj (vm
type
j ) − ρ jvm
type
j .
Each SC is assigned a state dependent action that permits the SCs
and their customers to change their VM instance generation and
consumption levels respectively. We assume a perfect competition
[14] of VM instance prices amongst the SCs in competition, and
following that the action for each SC i consists of committing a
certain amount of VM instances that influences the market-clearing
process. In this paper, we use the gradient play technique in game
theory [26] to derive the state dependent actions of the SCs and their
customers. Our use of the gradient play technique is motivated by
the fact that in many practical market environments stakeholders
(i) find it behaviorally difficult or computationally expensive to play
their best responses [14], (ii) have zero or incomplete knowledge of
the utilities of other stakeholders in themarket, and (iii) cannot even
observe the actions of other stakeholders in the worst case. In such
environments, gradient play is a suitable technique to achieve static
market equilibrium stability iteratively [15]. More specifically, for
our market setting the occurrence of (i)-(iii) is quite likely. Gradient
play also works when issues (i)-(iii) do not arise. The main idea
behind the gradient play technique is the use of ordinary differential
equations (ODEs) to describe the path of a perturbed system state to
the static market equilibrium state. Using gradient play, the action
for the the ith SC is given by
τ ri




























Here, the parameters τ ri , τ
b
i , and τ
pc
i are time constants that de-
scribe the speed with which the action of VM instance commitment
by SC i can be adjusted, and are free parameters to be determined.









i , and vm
pc∗
i , the solution to Equations 22a-22c
(see Appendix) at static market equilibrium. It can be seen that the
RHSs of 22a-22c are proportional to the gradient ∇vmri L, ∇vmbi
L,
and ∇vmpci
L respectively, where L is the Lagrangian of OPT. The
suite of equations 22a-22c can be solved independently by SC i . In
a similar fashion, using gradient play, the state dependent action












i − ρi . (11)
τ
aд
i is a free parameter to be determined that denotes the speed with
which the consumption action of SC customer i can be adjusted. The





i , the solution to Equation 22d at static market equilibrium.
It can be seen that the RHS of 12 is proportional to the gradient
∇vmaдi
L, i ∈ C , where L is the Lagrangian of OPT. Equation 12 can
be solved independently by each SC customer i .


















where the goal is to drive the solution ρi , ∀i ∈ SC to ρ∗i , the solution
of 22e at static market equilibrium. Here, τρi is the free parameter
denoting the speed with which ρi can be adjusted. Equations 10-12
represent a dynamic model of the overall SC market. It resembles a
repeated negotiation process where SC i responds with a commit-
ment of vmxi , x ∈ {r ,b,pc} to suggested prices ρi received from
the regulator; SC customer i responds with a consumption amount
ofvm
type
j , type ∈ {e, c, s}, to the same prices. The regulator in turn
adjusts its prices to these actions by the SCs and their customers,
and returns new prices, {ρi }, and the process continues till conver-
gence to the static market equilibrium. A compact representation
of the above-mentioned dynamic SC market is presented in Section 2
of the Appendix. This representation paves the way for analytically
analyzing the stability of such markets.
3.1.1 A Compact Representation. We need to compactly rep-
resent the above dynamic SC market model to pave the way for
analyzing the stability of such markets via the Arrow-Hurwicz crite-
rion that is based on the theory of Lyapunov stability (see Section
3.2). Using Equations 10-12, our proposed dynamic market mech-



















Definiton of Equation Parameters. We now describe the parameters















that is a vector of dimension (|SC | + |C | + 2|SC | − 1) × 1. Here,





−M1 0 0 M2
0 M3 0 −M4
0 0 0 −M5
−M6 M7 M8 0

,
A2 = [0 0 −M9 0].






type ∈ {r ,b,pc}. We assume that all for a given type, τ
type
i ’s are
equal for all i ∈ SC . M2 = Diaд(
1
τ typei
ATSC ), type ∈ {r ,b,pc},





i ), type ∈ {e, c, s}.
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ATC ), type ∈ {e, c, s}, where AC = Diaд(1). M5 =
Diaд(A′T BA), where A′ is an (n) × (n − 1) matrix of 1’s except for
the 0 diagonal elements, B is an n × n matrix with all entries 1
except for entries of the form Bii that take a value of zero, and
A is an n × n − 1 matrix. M6 = Diaд(
1
τ typeρi








where A is an (n − 1) × n matrix.M9 = [1]n×n .
The expression f2(x1,x2) is a projection function onto the non-
negative orthant, and is given by
f2(x1,x2) = [cx1 −VM
max]+x2 , (14)
where c = BA′R, R being a rotating matrix. of dimensionality
((|SC | − 1) × |SC | + |C | + 2|SC | − 1) × 1, and VMmax denotes a
vector of maximum VM instances committed by each individual
SC. The nth row of the projection [cx1 −VM





max(0, [cx1]n −VMmaxn , if [x2]n = 0
[cx1]n −VMmaxn , if[x2]n > 0
(15)
∆A1 in Equation 13 represents the resource availability pertur-
bations due to dynamics of the SC market. The value lies in a
perturbation set E, where E is given by




M10 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
M11 0 0 0
 ,










{r ,b,pc}, and ∆SC = Diaд(∆
type









, and ASC = Diaд(1). We also have
ESC expressed via the following:




SC∆SC ) ≤ πSC },




0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 M12 0 0
 ,
















C∆C ) ≤ πC },














α typei ) 0
]T
,
where x ∈ {r ,b,pc}, and y ∈ {e, c, s}. We assume that for given
x ,y, the values of αxi and α
y
i are equal for all i .
3.2 Stability Analysis of Dynamic Markets
In this section, we derive results regarding the stability of static
market equilibria in a dynamic SC market setting. Specifically, (i)
we derive the dynamic market equilibria obtained through gradient
play mechanics and compare it with the socially efficient static
market equilibria, and (ii) study the region of attraction around
dynamic market equilibria to derive stability connotations.
Case - 1:We first consider stability aspects when κ1j ,κ
2
j equals
zero, i.e., there are no curtailed jobs. In this case, the equilibria of
the dynamic SC market described through Equations 22a - 22c (via
the use of the gradient play technique), lies in the set





) be an equilibrium point in set E. We then have the





unique static SC market equilibrium obtained through Equations
22a - 22e. The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix.




) is identical to the unique
static market equilibrium obtained from the solution of OPT.
Theorem Implications. The theorem suggests that in the absence
of curtailed jobs, the equilibrium in a dynamic market setting is
unique, and converges to the static market equilibrium in which
the market existed initially before it was perturbed. Intuitively,
when the SC market is perturbed from its equilibrium setting, a
disequilibrium state might result, which will get resolved due to
our proposed gradient-play based approach that rolls back the dise-
quilibrium state to the original socially optimal static equilibrium
state. In this paper, we are able to roll back to the original state in
theory because of our assumptions regarding the nature of utility
functions. In practice, gradient play will guarantee a roll back of a
disequilibrium market state to an equilibrium state not necessarily
the original equilibrium state from which it was perturbed.
We now investigate the stability of the dynamic market equilib-
rium to find the region of attraction around itself. We introduce a







byV (y1,y2) a scalar, positive definite Lyapunov function expressed
as







where P1 and P2 are diagonal matrices. We use Lyapunov functions
from control theory [11] as a standard to prove the stability of
an equilibrium of a system represented via ordinary differential





where λmin(·) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of Q ,
β ≥ ||P1A2 + R
T [1]n×nP2 | |2,
where R is a rotating matrix, andψmin = min(ψi ),ψi being the coef-





We now have the following theorem characterizing stability of the
dynamic market equilibrium. The proof of the theorem is in the
Appendix.





is asymptotically stable for all initial conditions in
Ωcmax = {(y1,y2)| |V (y1,y2) ≤ cmax } for cmax > 0,
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2019 Pal et al.
such that
Ωcmax ⊊ D = {y2 ≥ 0| | |y2 | |2 ≤ d}
.
Theorem Implications. Intuitively, the theorem states that irrespec-
tive of any initial state the market is in, on being perturbed, it will
always come back to an equilibrium state from a disequilibrium
state. The Hurwitz (not the same as Hurwicz) nature of matrix A1
is determined from the time constants in Equations 10-12. Most
real systems satisfy the Hurwitz criterion in that A1 will be a real
square matrix constructed with coefficients of a real polynomial.
Case 2:We now consider stability aspects when κ1j ,κ
2
j does not
equal zero. In this case, the equilibria of the dynamic SC market
described through Equations 10a - 10c, also lies in the set E. We
define y1,y2, and V (y1,y2) as before but define d∆ as
d∆ = d − d∆SC + d∆C , (19)
where d is the same as in Equation 18, ∆SC and ∆SC represent the
supply demand perturbation matrices, and d∆SC and d∆C are given
by
d∆SC =




4λmin (P2)ψmin | |P1 | |2πj |j ∈ C
β2
. (20b)
We now have the following theorem characterizing market stability.
The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.3. Let A1 be Hurwitz, and let
πSC − πC <
λmin(Q)
2| |P1 | |2
(21)




) is asymptotically stable for all initial
conditions in
Ωcmax = {(y1,y2)| |V (y1,y2) ≤ cmax } f or cmax > 0,
such that Ωcmax ⊊ D = {y2 ≥ 0| | |y2 | |2 ≤ d∆}.
Theorem Implications. Similar to the implications of Theorem 3.2,
this theorem states that irrespective of any initial state the market
is in, on being perturbed, it will always come back to an equilibrium
state from a disequilibrium state.
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we addressed the problem of effective resource sharing
between small clouds (SCs). We modeled the problem as an efficient
supply-demand market design task consisting of (i) autonomous
SCs, (ii) their customers, and (iii) a regulator, as the market stake-
holders. The optimal market equilibrium point is prone to pertur-
bations due to the dynamic nature of the SC market, thereby poten-
tially leading to market disequilibrium. In this context, we designed
a dynamic market mechanism based on Arrow and Hurwicz’s dise-
quilibrium process that uses the gradient play technique in game
theory to converge upon the optimal static market efficient equi-
librium from a disequilibrium state caused due to supply-demand
perturbations, and results in market stability.
As part of future work, we plan to design provably fast dis-
tributed algorithms to allow markets to roll back to efficient equilib-
ria when perturbed from an equilibrium state, and study dynamic
SC markets under (i) a setting of imperfect (multi-resource) compe-
tition between SCs using general equilibrium theory[19], (ii) under
heterogeneous VM profiles, and (iii) a coalitional market setting
where SCs have the capability to collude with one another.
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5 APPENDIX
5.1 Static Market Analysis
In this section 5.1 we derive and analyze perfectly competitive SC
market equilibria. We assume perfect competition amongst SCs due
to their lack of economic power in influencing other SCs based on
their quantity of VM availability. Since prices in perfect competition
are strategic complements (in the terminology of Bulow, Geanako-
plos and Klemperer [12]), i.e., the decrease in an SC’s customer
price results in the decrease of customer prices charged by other
SCs in competition, we are going to eventually converge to a stage
where a single uniform customer price will prevail in the SC market
[12]. We are interested to know whether such a price results in
social welfare optimality. Equivalently, if a federated agency were
to centrally impose a customer charging price on all SCs (thereby
breaking their autonomy) that would maximize social welfare, what
would be the relationship between such a price (quantity) and the
market equilibrium price (quantity) outcome of the price-quantity
competition game? In this regard, we (a) formulate and solve an
optimization problem for a regulator who wishes to achieve socially
optimal market equilibria that maximizes utilitarian social welfare
amongst the market stakeholders, (b) characterize market equilibria
in the absence of a regulator and draw comparative relationships
between the equilibria obtained, with socially optimal market equi-
libria. In practice, the competition between SC firms is likely to be
imperfect in nature, and Laffont and Tirole have addressed models
[16] under such settings which result in market efficiency.
Optimization Problem Formulation - Here, we formulate a
regulator’s optimization problem so as to achieve socially optimal
market equilibria. The primary goal of the formulation is to maxi-
mize the net utilities for the SC customers, and minimize the net
cost of operation of SCs to reach a net maximum social welfare situ-













i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ SC,
where the objective function is to maximize social welfare SW (see










i ) representing total SC i supply. Ci is the
set of customers served by SC i . A potential solution to the above
optimization problem indicates the parameters at which the SC
market can ideally operate and (i) make all stakeholders satisfied to
a point that no one has an incentive to deviate, and (ii) maximize
the total satisfaction of all the stakeholders together. We denote
such an ideal state of market operation as a static socially efficient
market equilibrium.
Dual ProblemFormulation -Wewill solve OPT using the primal-
dual approach [25]. The advantage of using the primal-dual ap-
proach is that the dual optimization problem of the primal is always
convex [25], and its solution results in global optima which can
be related back to the optimal solution of the primal problem. Be-
fore deriving the dual optimization problem, we first define the
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where ρ = (ρ1, ...., ρn ) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the
constraint in OPT. The dual optimization problem, DOPT, is then
defined as follows.
DOPT: max inf
t :={vme ,vmc ,vms ,vmr ,vmb ,vmpc ,ρ }
L,
where vme ,vmc , and vms are vectors of customer VM types and
vmr ,vmb , and vmpc are vectors of SC VM types. Note that vm
aд
i




i . Thus, the goal here
is to find an optimal tuple t , that is an optimal solution to both OPT
and its dual.
Solving the Dual -The dual optimization problem is convex and
its optimal solution is found by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions [25] that are stated through equations 22a-22g.
Solving these equations, we obtain the optimal solution to DOPT.
The optimal solution to DOPT is the static market equilibrium. We
denote this solution by the tuple {vme∗,vmc∗,vms∗,vmr∗,vmb∗,vmpc∗, ρ∗}.






















































i ), ∀i ∈ SC . (22g)
Equilibrium inAutonomous Settings - The key question is whether
the solution to DOPT can be realized as a market equilibria in a
distributed autonomous setting. Based on the general equilibrium
theory in microeconomics [19], market equilibria in a perfectly
competitive autonomous setting of firms is known as Walrasian
equilibria. It turns out from general equilibrium results in [19] that
the unique optimal solution to DOPT (i) is a competitive Walrasian
equilibrium that is Pareto efficient, (ii) satisfies Arrow-Debreu’s first
and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics that es-
tablishes the if and only if relation between the existence of a
Walrasian equilibrium and its Pareto efficiency [19], (iii) maximizes
utilitarian social welfare (again derived from Arrow-Debreu’s first
and second fundamental theorems), and (iv) clears the market by
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 2019 Pal et al.
balancing total SC resource supply with consumer and SC resource
demand. Thus, in view of points (i) - (iv), a regulator’s social welfare
maximization objective coincides with the welfare state obtained
at market equilibrium in a distributed autonomous firm setting.We
consider this unique equilibrium state to be the benchmark at which
the SC market would be willing to always operate. However, in prac-
tice, for a perfectly competitive market with non-utilitarian social
welfare functions, there may be multiple Pareto efficient Walrasian
market equilbria that are not socially efficient.
Computing Socially Optimal Equilibrium - The optimal solu-
tion to the dual optimization problem, DOPT, can be obtained in an
iterative manner using a gradient approach, the principle behind
which is the Primal-Dual Interior Point Method [25]. We adopt the
Primal-Dual Interior Point method in our work because it has a
polynomial-time complexity to arrive at the optimal solution to
convex programs [22]. The basis of the method is to progressively
change the argument vector of DOPT so that minimal-Lagrange
multiplier ρ satisfies the KKT conditions.
Denote by v , DOPT’s argument vector sans the Lagrange mul-
tiplier ρ, {vme ,vmc ,vms ,vmr ,vmb ,vmpc }. Applying the Interior
Point method to DOPT gives us the the following equations:
v(t + ϵ) = v(t) − kv∇xL · ϵ . (23a)
ρ(t + ϵ) = ρ(t) + kρ∇xL · ϵ . (23b)
Here, kv and kρ are positive scaling parameters which control the
amount of change in the direction of the gradient. Letting ϵ → 0,
we get
τv Ûv(t) = −∇vL, (24a)




for y = v, ρ. The Interior Point Method converges
in polynomial time when the duality gap approaches zero, due to
the linear and super-linear convergence rate of the method [25].
5.2 Theorem Proofs




) when setting κ1j ,κ
2
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i ), ∀i ∈ SDC .
(25e)





exists is identical to the solution of the KKT conditions in
22a-22e. It can be seen that (25a) follows by replacing the cost
function for SDCs in (2)-(4) in (22a). Similarly, (25b) follows by
replacing the utility function of SDC customers in (5)-(8) in (22d).





the equilibrium in (22a)-(22e). Thus, we proved Theorem 3.1. ■
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Since strong duality holds, it follows from




∈ E exists. We first prove the
stability of this equilibrium point and then proceed to its asymptotic
stability. Differentiating the positive definite Lyapunov function










and y2 = x2 − x
∗
2
, and by using the non-expansive property
of the projection operation, we have
¯V (y1, y2) ≤ yT1 (P1A1 + A
T
1




If A1 is Hurwitz, for any Q > 0, there exists a positive definite
matrix P1 such that P1A1 + A
T
1
P1 = −Q . Let λmin(Q) denote the
minimum eigenvalue ofQ . Since P2 is a symmetric positive definite
matrix with a set n orthogonal, real, and non-zero eigenvectors







where λi > 0 is the eigenvalue corresponding to xi . We can expand
the vector VMmax using the orthogonal vectorwi as
VMmax
T
[1]n×nP2y2 ≥ λmin(P2)ψmin | |y2 | |2, (27)
whereψmin = min(ψi ),∀i = 1, ...,n. Now let
β ≥ ||P1A2 + R
T [1]n×nP2 | |2.
Using (26) and (27), we obtain
¯V (y1,y2) ≤ −λ(Q)
(
| |y1 | |2 −
β
λmin(Q)
| |y2 | |2
)
2





| |y2 | |
)
.
For all Ωmax ⊊ D, it follows that for all solutions beginning in
Ωmax , V ≤ 0. Hence, the equilibrium is stable and Ωmax is the
region of attraction.
Since the initial conditions start in Ω∆ and the latter is a strict
subset of D∆, y2 cannot be equal to 2λmin(P2)ψmin
λmin(Q )
β 2 . This
in turn implies that (| |y1 | |, | |y2 | | = (0, 0) is the only invariant set.
Hence, all solutions starting in Ω∆ converge to the equilibrium





). Thus, we proved Theorem 3.2. ■
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Differentiating the Lyapunov function
V (y1,y2) along the trajectories of (13), we get
¯V (y1, y2) ≤ −a∆
(
| |y1 | | −
β
a∆
| |y2 | |
)
2





| |y2 | |
)
, (28)
wherea∆ = λmin(Q)−2| |P1 | |πSDC+2| |P1 | |πC , and e = 2λmin(P2)ψmin.
From (21) it follows that a∆ > 0. Therefore, (25) implies that
for all Ωcmax ⊊ D∆, for all solutions beginning in Ω∆, V̄ ≤ 0.
Hence, the market equilibrium state is stable, and Ω∆ is the region
of attraction.
The asymptotic stability of the perturbed market can be shown
via the following argument: since the initial conditions start in
Ω∆ and the latter is a strict subset of D∆, y2 cannot be equal to
2λmin(P2)ψmin
λmin(Q )
β 2 . This in turn implies that (| |y1 | |, | |y2 | | = (0, 0)
is the only invariant set. Hence, all solutions starting inΩ∆ converge





). Thus, we have proved
Theorem 3.3. ■
